Facts of the Case
Tucson police officer Andrew Kisela and two other officers responded to a police radio report that a woman was engaging in erratic behavior with a knife. When they arrived, they saw Amy Hughes holding a large kitchen knife in what appeared to be a confrontation with another woman later identified as Sharon Chadwick. Despite at least two commands to drop the knife, Hughes did not do so and instead took several steps toward Chadwick. Kisela fired four shots through the chain link fence, seriously injuring Hughes.
Hughes sued Kisela under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that Kisela had used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to Kisela, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Hughes (as is required in a motion for summary judgment), was sufficient to demonstrate that Kisela violated the Fourth Amendment. Further, the Ninth Circuit next held that Kisela was not entitled to qualified immunity because, in its view, his actions violated clearly established law in that jurisdiction.
Question
Did Kisela's shooting of Hughes violate clearly established law, thus depriving him of qualified immunity?
Conclusion
Kisela's actions did not violate clearly established law, so he is entitled to qualified immunity. In a per curiam opinion, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, finding that Kisela's actions were not obviously unconstitutional nor clearly proscribed by existing law in the Ninth Circuit. In the absence of a decision in that circuit or by the Supreme Court clearly defining the right the officer violated such that he would have understood that he was violating it, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions. The Court did not consider whether his actions constituted excessive force.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. The dissent criticizes the Court for "misapprehend[ing] the facts and misappl[ying] the law, effectively treating qualified immunity as an absolute shield." The dissent argues that a jury could find that Kisela violated Hughes’ clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by his use of lethal force and accuses the Court of ignoring the facts that demonstrate a clear constitutional violation, focusing instead whether the right was clearly established. In the dissent's view, Kisela was on clear notice that his conduct was unconstitutional and thus was not entitled to qualified immunity.