Facts of the Case
In 1986, Danny Hill was convicted in an Ohio court for the torture, rape, and murder of a 12-year-old boy. An intermediate state court affirmed his conviction, as did the Ohio Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1993.
After unsuccessfully seeking to obtain post-conviction relief in state and federal court, Hill filed a new petition in Ohio state court arguing that his death sentence was illegal under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the criminal execution of a defendant who is “mentally retarded.” The trial court denied the claim, an intermediate court affirmed the denial, and the Ohio Supreme Court denied review.
In 2010, Hill filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking federal review of his Atkins claim. The federal district court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and granted habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which applies when a state-court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Though it expressly disclaimed reliance on the Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. __ (2017)—in which the Court struck down a state law that relied on outdated medical standards in determining intellectual disability for the purpose of eligibility for the death penalty—the Sixth Circuit repeatedly cited the language and the decision of Moore itself in reaching its decision granting the petition.
Question
Did the Sixth Circuit err in determining that the decisions of Ohio courts as to a defendant’s intellectual disability were contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent at the time?
Conclusion
In a per curiam opinion issued without oral argument, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit erroneously relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. __ (2017) to grant the defendant’s habeas relief because that decision had not been decided at the time of the state-court decisions. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion draws heavily from the language of Moore, and it was not even until that court asked for supplemental briefing on the applicability of Moore did the defendant introduce the argument that underpinned the court’s decision granting habeas relief. Because Moore had not been decided until after the state-court decisions, the Court remanded the case for the Sixth Circuit to determine whether, without Moore, the relevant legal rules were clearly established such that habeas relief would be appropriate.